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• Behind Europe's current venture mania lie unique developments of the 1990s, which include massive subsidies from
several European governments. Proponents of these subsidies seem to expect that domestic venture capital indus-
tries will generate productivity effects and welfare gains on the same scale as those seen in the US, where venture
capital has spurred the formation and growth of Silicon Valley and other successful clusters of innovative activity. But
European governments will be able to design efficient support policies only if they understand that venture capital is
necessarily linked to specialization and cannot be expected to play the same role in any two economies whose
place, and contribution, within the international division of labour differ.
• Venture capital investment patterns in the US, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands show persistent differences,
not only with respect to size, but also with respect to the concentration across fields of technology and development
stages of target firms. Venture capital investments in the US are more heavily concentrated in the biotechnology and
computer-related industries and in the earlier stages of firm development than those in Europe.
• The main differences between national venture capital markets can be explained by a theory of competition among
venture capitalists which emphasizes the role of reputation in their race for capital commitments and promising in-
vestment opportunities in new technology-based firms. Reputation helps to overcome information asymmetries be-
tween outside investors and technological innovators and is primarily built through a track record of successful initial
public offerings of common stock in young technology-based firms. Historically, US venture capitalists have enjoyed
a more favourable market environment, including large stock markets and a fragmented banking system, and thus
have had more time and opportunity to build a reputation.
• The technological specialization, which venture capitalists choose to reduce risk by active control of individual in-
vestments instead of mere diversification across many passive financings, is a learning process which mainly im-
proves venture capitalists' proficiency in handling the particular information asymmetries and incentive problems in
the early stage of new technology ventures. And since the social benefits from successful early-stage investments
tend to be particularly large, venture capitalists' learning raises the social and private returns to financial intermedia-
tion. But policymakers must understand that the learning process takes time and cannot simply be accelerated
through policies which merely increase the quantity of inflowing funds without improving their quality.
• As a catalyst for the learning process, there may be a role for public subsidies if an emerging venture capital market
initially lacks the critical size and liquidity. However, subsidies would be a waste of resources if policy-induced barri-
ers, embedded in tax laws, capital market regulations and other institutions, artificially inflate venture capital's user
cost, or if structural conditions, partly determined by an economy's factor endowments, ultimately prevent a viable
venture capital industry. In Germany and other European countries, specific policy barriers to venture capital and se-
rious impediments to structural change are calling for a coherent policy strategy which must go beyond simple sub-
sidy schemes.
• In their choice of policy instruments, governments face a dilemma in that only .some of the more activist subsidy
schemes seem to yield measurable results, but governments in countries without an established venture capital in-
dustry lack the technological and market knowledge required to design and execute such schemes effectively. In any
case, guarantee schemes, like those tried in the Netherlands, are to be rejected because instead of solving the in-
centive problems, they may even aggravate them. However, loan schemes, like those implemented in the US and
Germany, fare somewhat better on theoretical grounds but are still difficult to evaluate empirically.
• The removal of the remaining policy barriers, and not the continued subsidization of venture capital, should be the
priority in Europe. Efficiency, and not quantitative targets for capital inflows, must be the objective. Yet, efficiency is
intimately linked to specialization — implying investments that are highly concentrated not just in a narrow subset of
high technologies, but also in a few European regions and countries only. Policymakers will have to accept that not
even the removal of all policy barriers can create a vibrant venture capital industry everywhere.
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Over the course of the past twenty years, ven-
ture capital has fuelled an entrepreneurial revo-
lution — first in the United States and now in
Europe's common market —, which has opened
new opportunities for technological innovation,
capital investment and employment growth.
Some of the most promising opportunities are
in science-based industries, like software and
biotechnology, which are often seen as driving
the transformation to an increasingly knowl-
edge-based economy. Indeed, this transforma-
tion would hardly be conceivable without the
innovative contributions of business start-ups
that rely on venture capital to finance their
early stages of growth. So what, if anything,
should governments do to support venture
capital and help this transformation along? This
paper will argue that governments must under-
stand that venture capital is necessarily linked
to specialization and therefore cannot be ex-
pected to play the same role in any two
economies whose place, and contribution,
within the international division of labour dif-
fer.
The essence of venture capital is a combi-
nation of temporary equity participation in a
privately held firm and of management services
provided by a specialized financial intermediary
who usually seeks to exit, and profit, via an
initial public offering or a trade sale once the
firm has established a track record in the market
place. This definition excludes buyout financ-
ing for established firms, which is often mis-
labelled as venture capital in Europe. In the
1990s, governments in many countries have
tried to actively promote the development of
venture capital, sometimes lavishly spending
taxpayers' money. This policy is, often explic-
itly, based on the assumption that venture
capital provides an efficient financing solution
for young technology-based firms when credit
markets fail to make sufficient external funds
available. But the evident success of venture
capital in a subset of high-tech industries and in
a small number of 'fortunate' regions and
countries need not imply that governments' role
is to bring this form of financial intermediation
to life everywhere.
It is the economics of venture capital which
implies an intimate link with technological and
industrial specialization. Venture capital strictly
defined is offered only to innovators in the sub-
set of high technologies requiring a dispropor-
tionate amount of intangible investment, like
software and biotechnology. In addition to this
macro-dimension, there is an equally important
micro-dimension to specialization. Because in-
dividual venture capitalists learn from expe-
rience, they tend to become more proficient
over time in screening, selecting and supporting
new firms from the — often rather narrow —
area of technology in which the bulk of their
specific experiences falls. This increasing profi-
ciency allows the experienced venture capitalist
to carve out a technological niche for himself
and to raise the returns on his investments by
progressively becoming involved in start-up
firms at ever earlier, and riskier, stages of busi-
ness formation and growth. Incidentally, this
process of specialization, which is undertaken
to reduce risk by active control of each indi-
vidual investment instead of mere diversifica-
tion across a multitude of collateralized financ-
ings, raises the social as well as the private re-
turns to financial intermediation.
In open economies, specialization in both the
macro- and micro-dimension may create addi-
tional welfare gains by enhancing the inter-
national division of labour. Of course, only in
the short term does the quantity and quality of
venture capital supply constitute an exogenous
endowment and thus a potential source of com-
parative advantage for an economy in the sense
suggested by Nelson (1995). In the long term,
both the quality and quantity are endogenous,
so that venture capital specialization, and its
concomitantly uneven distribution, ultimately
leads to trade-related welfare gains mainly from
exploiting increasing returns to scale. This hy-
pothesis is based on the idea that dynamic scale
economies are relevant in the venture capi-
talist's own learning as well as in the creation
and application of knowledge in those newhigh-tech firms whose formation is facilitated
by venture capital.
In any event, the emergence of venture capi-
tal in one country can bring welfare gains not
only to the domestic economy, but via speciali-
zation also to its trading partners. Conse-
quently, policies to support and expand an
existing, yet underdeveloped venture capital in-
dustry at home may generate positive inter-
national externalities. On the other hand, gov-
ernments seeking to establish a domestic ven-
ture capital industry for the first time, and at
any price, risk making their own country worse
off even if they succeed. The reason is that they
may thwart an international division of labour
more in line with fundamental comparative ad-
vantages or countries' different potential to
realize economies of scale.
An effective and efficient policy strategy
must therefore build on a theory that explains
the linkages between an economy's financial
sector, the governance of innovative ventures in
different industries and economy-wide patterns
of specialization. Although no comprehensive
and widely accepted theory is as yet available,
this paper spells out what appear to be the
essential elements of such a theory and dis-
cusses some casual empirical support. Its impli-
cations for policy suggest that governments
should make their support for venture capital
contingent on the domestic potential relative to
other countries with which the economy is
linked through trade and capital flows.
Public subsidies for venture capital invest-
ments can probably serve as a useful catalyst
when an emerging venture capital market
merely lacks the critical size and liquidity to be
viable in the long term. In this case, subsidies
can be thought of as supporting an economy-
wide learning process akin to learning-by-doing
in infant-industry models of international trade.
However, a subsidy programme would be
wasting resources if at least one of the follow-
ing two conditions holds: first, if policy-
induced barriers, embedded in tax laws, capital
market regulations and other institutions, arti-
ficially inflate the user cost of venture capital;
and second, if structural conditions, in large
part determined by an economy's factor en-
dowments or persistent patterns of inherited
specialization, ultimately prevent the emer-
gence of a viable venture capital industry alto-
gether. While it remains to be seen how per-
sistent or flexible the current structures of
European economies really are, policy-induced
barriers certainly play an important role in
Germany and other European countries. In
these countries, both specific barriers to venture
capital and serious impediments to structural
change, prominently due to rigid labour mar-
kets, are calling for a more coherent policy re-
sponse.
A coherent policy must primarily tackle the
barriers, provided the economy possesses the
potential to benefit from a self-sustaining ven-
ture capital industry in the long term. Govern-
ments must therefore look beyond the micro-
economic evidence for market failure in credit
markets. They must first of all assess the home
country's macroeconomic potential to sustain a
competitive venture capital market and a cor-
responding pattern of specialization in indus-
tries with sufficient demand for venture capital
in the long term. This potential may be con-
strained by internal conditions, like the supply
of skilled scientists, engineers and managers or
the size, liquidity and institutional sophistica-
tion of domestic financial markets, as well as by
external conditions, like inherited patterns of
industrial and technological specialization, de-
termined by the economy's role within the in-
ternational division of labour. Because the de-
mand for venture capital obviously depends on
an economy's macroeconomic potential to be
competitive in industries with a demand for
venture capital, the policy environment is de-
termined by a mixture of internal and external
conditions, only some of which also affect the
supply of venture capital. Especially with re-
spect to the external conditions, the government
may be either unable or unwilling to induce
sufficient change within a given time frame.
It is after the potential for a viable venture
capital market has been established, that the
government must identify the barriers, the
conditions which can and have to be changed in
order to unleash venture capital's full potential.
These barriers may constrain either the supplyof or the demand for venture capital. Their re-
moval may require general policy reforms to
improve incentives as well as the adoption of
appropriate instruments to address specific
market failures in the allocation of capital.
Needless to say that both the identification of
barriers and the assessment of venture capital's
macroeconomic potential require a sound un-
derstanding of the microeconomics of venture
capital and of the overall incentives that laws
and regulations imply for intangible invest-
ments. In the remainder of this paper, we will
sketch the relevant theory (Section 1), present
some evidence (Section 2) and discuss policy
options (Section 3), before drawing our conclu-
sions (Section 4) on the questions raised in this
introduction.
1 Venture Capital and Specializa-
tion: Towards a Comprehensive
Theory
The key to understanding venture capital is
specialization. The two most basic dimensions
are specialization in the formation and expan-
sion of fast-growing firms and specialization in
a subset of high technologies. Indeed, this
double focus is what distinguishes genuine
venture capital and yields macroeconomic im-
plications. We shall argue below that the degree
of specialization by individual venture capital-
ists is related to their efficiency as financial in-
termediaries. But chiefly, the macroeconomic
relevance of venture capital is related to the
special importance of new firms as driving
forces of innovation in certain areas of high
technology, an explanation of which must
therefore be the first step in any comprehensive
theory of venture capital. The second step must
be to explain the special problems which inno-
vators in these areas of technology face in the
market for commercial bank credit. Only there-
after can the comparative advantage of venture
capital vis-a-vis other forms of financial inter-
mediation be fully appreciated. The third step
then is to explain how open economies' endow-
ment with venture capital can be, at least in the
short term, a source of comparative advantage
in those areas of high technology where effi-
ciency requires that a decentralized industrial
organization of innovation is matched with the
appropriate institution of financial intermedia-
tion. Our discussion of policy implications,
which largely derive from the hypothesis that
countries' endowment with venture capital is
endogenous in the long term, is deferred until
after the review of empirical evidence.
1.1 The Role of New Firms in Techno-
logical Innovation
The hypothesis that market structure and tech-
nological innovation are interdependent goes
back at least to Joseph Schumpeter (1942).
Economists have long recognized non-rivalry in
using knowledge and the difficulties of fully
appropriating the returns to new knowledge as
distinguishing economic features of innovation.
With full appropriability, it would be surprising
that not all industrial research and development
(R&D) is carried out by technology-specific
monopolies, internalizing the increasing returns
to scale which the creation and application of
knowledge entails. Schumpeter thought that
capitalism would evolve towards an increasing
monopolization of technology-based industries,
and hence would ultimately adopt a form of
industrial organization closely resembling cen-
tral planning, as in socialist economies. But this
has not happened, and the process of innovation
in some of the most dynamic fields of high
technology today appears to be more decen-
tralized than ever.
New thinking about the industrial organi-
zation of innovation, which this observation has
prompted, builds on the paradigm of incomplete
contracts, formally introduced by Grossman
and Hart (1986). It emphasizes the problem of
incentives in a world of fundamental uncer-
tainty. According to this view, innovation is
inevitably governed by incomplete contracts
because neither the characteristics, nor the tim-
ing of genuine innovations can be specified in
advance. It is simply beyond the human capac-
ity for information processing to describe all
possible outcomes in advance and estimate
probabilities for their occurrence. Relative tothe complexity of the decision problem, human
rationality is clearly bounded.
The salient economic features of incomplete
contracts are the assignment of ownership rights
and decision-making authority to the various
parties in the innovation process (Aghion and
Howitt 1998). If complete contracts were avail-
able, there would be no need for discretionary
decision-making after closing the contract, and
the allocation of ownership would be irrelevant
for efficiency (Coase 1960). Complete contracts
would simply specify in advance what the de-
fining features of the innovation were to be,
how it were to be used and how the revenues
were to be shared among the contracting parties
in all possible states of nature. Under incom-
plete contracts, the optimal assignment of
ownership and decision rights partly depends
on attitudes towards risk and on the relative
efficiency of the agents' efforts to find the in-
novation, as in the principal-agent literature.
Beyond that, the assignment also depends on
technology-specific factors, like the role of
complementary investments and systemic inno-
vations, as well as on the conditions of trans-
mitting proprietary information to the producers
and users of the innovation without letting too
much knowledge spill over to competitors. The
nature of optimal contracts governing inno-
vation in a second-best world of fundamental
uncertainty varies with these conditions, thus
minimizing the overall costs of achieving com-
mercial success.
These incomplete contracts typically involve
the creators of new ideas, often specialists with
the necessary skills to do pertinent research, as
one party, and the manufacturers or the users of
an innovation as the other party. Ideally, the
contracts distribute the private incentives so
that each party makes the socially optimal ef-
fort. For example, in software and biotechnol-
ogy, two of the currently most dynamic areas of
high technology, many ideas are radical in the
sense that they threaten to make proprietary
technologies of established firms obsolete. This
is one reason why the incentives to pursue in-
novations may be stronger in independent new
firms than in large established firms, and why
new firms have indeed been the preferred venue
for many of the most noticeable and profitable
innovations in these areas of technology.
Put differently, the optimal industrial organi-
zation of innovation should be consistent with a
distribution of incentives according to the com-
parative advantages of the parties involved. Be-
cause ownership is normally the best arrange-
ment to incite effort, property rights should be
assigned to the party whose input, including
knowledge, is more important for successful in-
novation. Yet, the most important input need
not always be creativity or research; instead,
product development and production capabili-
ties are probably more important for the ulti-
mate success of innovations in manufacturing
industries like automobiles and aircraft. Inno-
vations in these industries typically have their
origin within the integrated R&D departments
of large corporations possessing the relevant
capabilities for rapid product development,
manufacturing and marketing. Economies of
scale in these latter activities, in turn, are the
main reason for the highly concentrated market
structure which characterizes in particular the
automobile and aircraft industry. It is when
knowledge and ideas are the most important in-
puts that the innovation process is more likely
to be dominated by independent new firms
which are, at least partly, owned by the creative
talent itself. This may include researchers with
special skills as well as the originator of the
basic business idea. Both software and biotech-
nology are prototypes of an industry with many
independent owner-innovators, where indeed
capital requirements in manufacturing and dis-
tribution are often negligible.
On the other hand, the optimal industrial or-
ganization must not be detrimental to the
transmission of new knowledge between the
various participants in the innovation process. It
therefore matters that the costs of transmitting
specific, often tacit knowledge needed to pro-
duce or use an innovation tend to be lower
when the innovator is integrated into a large
manufacturing firm or user organization. For
example, the benefits of lower information
costs to users can explain why many large firms
have their own consulting and software devel-
opment units providing customized solutionsfor firm-specific problems. In similar vein, the
transmission of tacit knowledge plays an impor-
tant role in setting up the production of com-
plex manufacturing goods, which can explain
the prevalence of in-house R&D departments in
the chemical and machinery industries. In the
case of software, however, the production and
distribution of copies does not require any un-
derstanding of its content so that integration of
the developer with an experienced manufacturer
is unnecessary. And while users, who often in-
cur substantial learning costs upon the adoption
of new software, should be able to benefit from
the transfer of the developer's tacit knowledge,
they are usually too dispersed to make inte-
gration feasible. Because software innovations
primarily generate codified knowledge, which
is easy to distribute, the specific costs of
transmitting tacit knowledge do not appear to
be a relevant constraint on the industrial organi-
zation of software development. Similar reason-
ing may apply to large parts of the biotech-
nology industry.
On the whole then, economic theory predicts
that the importance of new firms in techno-
logical innovation is contingent on economic
characteristics of the respective area of technol-
ogy. But there is also reason to believe that the
optimal industrial organization may be pre-
vented from developing by certain constraints,
in particular on the supply of external finance
for new technology-based firms. Financial
constraints do not only show up in terms of
quantitative restrictions, but also in a restricted
empirical variety of external financing instru-
ments, including standard credit contracts, pub-
lic and private equity issues as well as financial
innovations like convertible debt and preferred
stock which are rarely used in Europe.
1.2 Financial Constraints in Tech-
nological Innovation
Financial constraints interfere with technologi-
cal innovation both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. Not only do they restrain an economy's
overall innovation effort, they also distort its
industrial organization and the governance of
individual innovations. On balance, the distor-
tions are likely to be towards too much integra-
tion in large corporations, which tend to have
lower costs of raising external funds than small
firms in general and technology-based new
firms in particular. Moreover, because the op-
timal industrial organization varies across tech-
nologies and industries, so does the impact of
financial constraints — which in turn implies
that they may even distort the structural com-
position of the entire economy. By partially re-
lieving technology-based business start-ups of
their specific financial constraints, venture
capital can support a less integrated organiza-
tion. It may thus enhance efficiency when eco-
nomic properties of the respective technology
render a more decentralized industrial organi-
zation optimal than would, ceteris paribus,
emerge in the absence of venture capital. But
for reasons related to the management of inno-
vation by incomplete contracts, venture capital
will usually remain a second-best solution, im-
plying persistent financial constraints.
The quantitative constraints on technological
innovation are best understood in the context of
theoretical models of bank lending with equi-
librium credit rationing, based on Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). These models suggest that inno-
vative ventures in high technology are rela-
tively unattractive for bank lending not merely
because the expected future returns are more
risky than those in conventional investment
projects. Instead, what matters most is that the
distribution of information about future returns
is more asymmetric between the innovator and
outside financiers in high technology, and that a
larger part of the financial investment goes into
intangible capital which cannot serve as col-
lateral. Informational asymmetry is important
with respect to both the behaviour and the
quality of the young, often inexperienced,
owner-managers in new technology-based
firms, who have neither established a track re-
cord in terms of financial information on their
new venture, nor built a pertinent reputation in
previous job assignments.
When a wealth-constrained entrepreneur
seeks debt financing, asymmetry of information
may create the two well-known incentive prob-
lems of moral hazard, in which a borrower— after the contract is closed — changes her
investment plan and thereby harms the creditor,
and of adverse selection, in which self-selection
raises the average riskiness of borrowers whose
individual riskiness is determined by exogenous
hidden characteristics. Agency costs tend to in-
crease as assets become less tangible and more
specific. And since a higher rate of interest on
bank credit tends to aggravate the incentive
problems, banks cannot freely adjust the rate of
interest to equilibrate credit supply and demand.
Instead, the optimal rate of interest is associated
with a second-best equilibrium in which either
each individual borrower is rationed (moral
hazard) or rationing excludes a subset of loan
applicants (adverse selection).
Gale and Hellwig (1985) have shown that the
standard credit contract indeed solves the in-
centive problems optimally when the observa-
tion of the borrower's investment behaviour
and outcome is costly to the creditor. The stan-
dard credit contract minimizes the solvency risk
by stipulating a fixed rate of interest, minimizes
the creditor's total expected loss by demanding
collateral and minimizes the creditor's costs be-
cause the borrower's behaviour is scrutinized
only in case of default. However, the standard
contract breaks down when the borrower cannot
offer sufficient collateral because she invests
predominantly in intangible assets to realize her
innovation. Moreover, innovation in high tech-
nology usually precludes that banks use other
strategies of overcoming information asymme-
try, in particular by inferring expected returns
to specific investment projects from past obser-
vations of similar projects and by judging the
management quality from an established track
record. Instead, many banks simply refuse to
lend to any new technology-based firm alto-
gether.
The absence of banks creates the niche which
venture capitalists fill by specializing on financ-
ing the early stages of young technology-based
firms, typically including their start-up and ini-
tial expansion phase. But there is a caveat: Be-
cause venture capital itself is a highly selective
form of financial intermediation, it may intro-
duce distortions of its own. It is not indis-
criminately offered to all technology-based
start-ups which are shunned by banks. More-
over, the absence of banks alone cannot explain
why venture capitalists typically seek to divest
their private equity shares soon after the inves-
tee firm has attained the ability to attract more
conventional forms of external finance, through
a trade sale or an initial public offering of
shares. This desire for divestment, timed to
realize the expected supernormal returns within
a period of five to seven years (Gorman and
Sahlman 1989), tends to exclude all those start-
ups which, in spite of their intangible invest-
ments, are not expected to match the growth
rates observed in the most dynamic sectors of
high technology.
Like a credit contract, venture capital estab-
lishes a financing relationship that is long-term,
yet intended to be temporary from the outset. In
many other ways, however, the solution that
venture capital provides is the exact opposite of
bank lending, fully in line with the fundamental
dichotomy of debt versus equity finance.
Whereas the standard credit contract offered by
banks seeks to minimize the incentive problem
through collateral and a fixed rate of interest,
venture capital seeks to pre-empt the incentive
problem through ongoing managerial support,
monitoring and control of the new venture. In-
stead of reducing risk through portfolio diver-
sification and demanding collateral, venture
capitalists seek to actively control the risk of
individual investments and to share individual
risks in syndicated financing. Their compara-
tive advantage in controlling risk derives from
technological specialization. Being technologi-
cally specialized, they can actually exercise
control more cost effective than commercial
banks could. In fact, successful venture capital
firms are often led by veterans of the industry,
who built their own technology-based firm and
have become rich by selling it off in the stock
market. A typical venture capitalist in the
United States, whose firm is structured as a
limited partnership, invests some of his own
money as well as that of other private investors
and large pension funds.
By focusing investments on technologies
within his own area of professional expertise,
the venture capitalists can directly reduce in-formational asymmetries. First of all, this miti-
gates the adverse selection problem. Better
screening of potential investee firms forces new
entrepreneurs to offer projects with higher ex-
pected returns on average and thus, indeed,
helps to bring about a more efficient allocation
of resources from a social point of view (Chan
1983). Secondly, reduced information asymme-
try also helps to mitigate moral hazard by re-
ducing the costs of shifting a large share of
entrepreneurial control to the venture capitalist
within a long-term financing relationship using
convertible securities, syndication and staging
of investments as control mechanisms in an
essentially incomplete contract.
The staging of capital infusions is the most
powerful control mechanism at the venture
capitalist's disposal. By creating the option to
abandon the project, staging can serve as an
effective monitoring and screening device
helping to reduce moral hazard as well as ad-
verse selection (Sahlman 1990; Gompers 1995).
With respect to adverse selection, periodic
monitoring can be considered as repeated
screening, yielding an increasingly accurate
picture of the entrepreneur's true skill as her
venture progresses. With respect to moral
hazard, staging sets strong incentives for the
entrepreneur to align her behaviour with the
interests of the venture capitalist: In order to
win continued financial support, she will avoid
strategies with high personal returns at the
expense of outside shareholders or with an
excessive variance of returns. Because monitor-
ing is costly, the venture capitalist will check
the status of the project only periodically, each
time preserving the option to abandon it during
the next round. The frequency of project
evaluations and capital infusions will depend on
the relative size of agency and monitoring
costs: The larger the agency costs, the shorter
will be the duration of funding intervals, imply-
ing a stronger overall intensity of monitoring
(Gompers 1995).
Syndication and covenants are used to limit
opportunistic behaviour to which repeated bar-
gaining might be vulnerable. Hart and Moore
(1994) have shown that the option of the
entrepreneur to repudiate her financial obliga-
tions limits the feasible amount of outsider
claims. Syndication lowers the value of the re-
pudiation option by making it difficult, or even
impossible, for the entrepreneur to obtain suc-
cession financing from competing venture
capitalists. Like syndication, covenants can
make the threat of liquidation more real for the
entrepreneur, should she be abandoned by her
venture capitalist (Lerner 1994a; Gompers and
Lerner 1996). Syndication, however, raises the
question of contract robustness, which appears
to require that the lead venture capitalist, who is
usually better informed, maintains a fixed frac-
tion of the firm's equity over time (Admati and
Pfleiderer 1994).
Convertible securities can be interpreted as
yet another means to limit opportunistic behav-
iour, such as "window-dressing", which aims
at short-term success in the next round of stage
financing. Cornelli and Yosha (1997) have
shown that the incentives to engage in short-
termism instead of long-term value creation are
endemic in stage financing, but can be attenu-
ated by using convertible debt or convertible
preferred equity in addition to straight debt and
equity financing. Convertible securities can im-
prove incentives by threatening to transfer con-
trol if certain profit, sales or performance mile-
stones are not attained. Preferred equity differs
from common stock primarily through a higher
level of protection in the event of liquidation
and through postponement of dividend pay-
ments in the event of a loss. The special variant
of no-load convertible preferred stock, which
never pays any dividend, has a liquidation pref-
erence and may be converted to common stock
at the behest of the holder, is often used for
financing the start-up and early expansion
stages in the United States. Young firms that
are more established tend to be financed by
debt with warrants, options to buy common
stock at a prespecified price in the future. Since
the creditor will thus share the firm's success if
it grows strongly, he will initially be willing to
accept a lower rate of interest and less restric-
tive covenants on the entrepreneur's manage-
ment, in the hope of reducing the probability of
a liquidity crisis. The payoff structure of all
these convertible securities essentially seeks to10
preserve liquidity within the start-up business
and to improve incentives relative to common
stock by turning the entrepreneur's stake into
the equivalent of a call option. The potential
transition of control rights to the venture capi-
talist does not only serve as a disciplinary threat
ex ante, but also effectively relieves the entre-
preneur of responsibility, should her manage-
ment skills turn out to be inadequate for the
venture's later stages of product development
and market entry.
To make the transition of control credible as
a disciplinary threat, the venture capitalist must
of course possess the technological expertise
which can usually be acquired only via spe-
cialization and learning. Credibility of staging
is also reinforced by the preannounced tempo-
rary nature of all venture capital investments
which seek to profit from realizing capital gains
upon exit. However, the ability of the venture
capitalist to exit successfully within the antici-
pated time frame may be impaired by the same
sort of information asymmetries that provided
an opportunity for venture capital in the first
place. Although venture capitalists will ideally
seek to sell off their shares in the stock market
via an initial public offering (IPO), this may be
difficult to achieve when most outside investors
are poorly informed. The public may be willing
to buy the shares only at a substantial discount
(Amit et al. 1998). A trade sale to an informed
outside investor, such as an established firm in
the industry, or to the venture's own managers
or its founding entrepreneur may be a more
attractive alternative, unless the venture capi-
talist can accurately signal the true value of his
venture shares to the public by building a repu-
tation for presenting high quality ventures in
public offerings. Amit et al. (1998) have there-
fore proposed that exits via IPOs would be
chosen for the better-performing ventures, trade
sales for the rest.
It thus appears that the intentionally tempo-
rary nature of venture capital is determined by
the nature of competition among venture capi-
talists themselves. They tend to compete for the
best investment opportunities under increasing
returns to reputation, which in turn is based on
actual ability and past experience. Reputation
matters both in attracting new technology-based
firms as investees, who do not want to fail as a
result of incompetent management support, and
in persuading outside investors to supply capi-
tal, which is typically locked in for several
years. It is this double challenge which forces
venture capitalists to concentrate their invest-
ments, and that not only in those areas of tech-
nology where they already excel, but more gen-
erally in those areas of business where unique
experiences feed back into higher ability
through learning-by-doing. Put differently, it
pays to build a reputation for excellence where
it matters most, namely in screening, monitor-
ing and supporting the management of new
ventures. As the investee firm matures, the
special combination of financial and non-
financial services loses its efficiency relative to
more traditional forms of financial interme-
diation.
It is thus a sign of a highly competitive ven-
ture capital industry when individual venture
capitalists cannot afford to extend their services
beyond their particular area of comparative, and
often absolute, advantage without jeopardizing
their most valuable asset, namely their repu-
tation. As a corollary, venture capitalists time
the divestment of their private equity shares so
as to maximize the returns to their reputation.
These returns are increasing in the number as
well as in the quality of business start-ups
brought to market (Gompers 1996). Moreover,
venture capitalists will seek to contract young
firms as early as their ability of assessing the
specific risks and expected returns of prospec-
tive investees allows without lowering the ex-
pected returns. This ability can be enhanced by
maintaining a rather narrow focus on a small
range of closely related technology over time.
Technological specialization of venture capital-
ists is the more important, the earlier the stage
at which they get involved with business start-
ups, because the riskiness tends to decrease
over the lifetime of new firms.
Summing up, technological specialization of
individual venture capitalists is not merely the
result of arbitrary learning from any new in-
vestments and the active involvement in the
management of concomitant innovations. And11
the process of specialization does not simply
reinforce any initial technological expertise.
Instead, technological specialization is mainly
an implication of strategic choices calculated to
enhance competitiveness vis-a-vis other venture
capitalists in the race for the most profitable in-
vestment opportunities. Moreover, technologi-
cal specialization and the specialization on the
early stages of new firms are really two sides
of the same coin. Not only are they inter-
dependent, but both enhance efficiency in the
investment process of innovating economies.
Put differently, venture capital combines two
dimensions of financial intermediation, namely
the provision of outside finance in case of fail-
ing credit markets and the transition of new
technology-based firms to maturity, with the
latter including the recycling of excess profits
from successful divestments.
1.3 Venture Capital and Changing
Comparative Advantages in Open
Economies
Economists have traditionally attributed the
comparative advantages of an economy to im-
mutable structural conditions, like the econ-
omy's exogenous endowment with primary
factors of production. Since existing venture
capitalists are not only technologically special-
ized, but also geographically bounded in their
ability to monitor and support the management
of portfolio firms effectively, they too can be
interpreted as an endowment of locations and as
a potential source of a comparative advantage,
at least in the short term. Moreover, since many
of the high-tech goods and services brought to
market with the support of venture capital are
traded globally, the comparative advantage
from an endowment with venture capital is
rarely confined to individual regions and their
interregional trade, but often extends to the
economy at large. Consequently, the spatial
distribution of venture capital can help explain
international as well as regional patterns of
trade.
Bank credit, by contrast, benefits from an ef-
fective interbank market which spurs the
mobility of credit finance across regions and
countries. The differential impact of credit mar-
ket constraints on new ventures in different
areas of technology determines how important a
substitute for bank credit really is for industrial
innovation in those areas, and, consequently,
how important venture capital can be as a
source of comparative advantage for different
categories of tradeables. In general, the impact
is greater when investments are riskier and
when they result in a higher share of intangible
capital. An abundant supply of venture capital
thus gives a broad comparative advantage in
risky technologies requiring a high share of
intangible investments, software being the
prime example.
But there are several reasons why an econ-
omy's comparative advantage from venture
capital may actually lie in a more narrow subset
of high technologies. One, of course, is that
venture capitalists' competitiveness in screen-
ing potential investee firms as well as in moni-
toring and supporting their management pre-
supposes that they themselves are technologi-
cally specialized. Another reason is that the im-
pact of credit constraints may also depend on an
industry's specific need for external finance in
general. Returning to the example of software,
network externalities, scale economies and
rapid product cycles all imply that competition
among new entrants to this industry is rather
like the winner-takes-all variety. External fi-
nancing is then often crucial to help business
start-ups gain a dominant market position suf-
ficiently fast in order to win against competing
firms at home or abroad and against alternative
technological paradigms. Industries, by con-
trast, where expansion of young firms is largely
financed from retained earnings may never de-
velop a demand for venture capital.
In the long term, an economy's supply of
venture capital is of course endogenous, and the
static notion of comparative advantage must be
complemented by a dynamic perspective, in
which localization advantages may be self-rein-
forcing. The recent literature on endogenous
growth in open economies (Grossman and
Helpman 1991) has noted that private profit-
seeking investments can have the effect of
changing an economy's factor endowment over12
time, with the relevant factors being non-trade-
able private and public inputs for the production
of tradeable goods. Examples are the pool of
engineers who acquire new skills from learning-
by-doing in high-tech industries and the knowl-
edge spillovers from innovative activities in
private firms, which often appear to be local-
ized (Jaffe et al. 1993). In line with this theory
of dynamic comparative advantages, we argue
that also the specialized business services sup-
plied by venture capitalists comprise non-trade-
able private and public inputs, whose accu-
mulation may change the comparative advan-
tages of an open economy.
Thus, our explanation of venture capital's
role in shaping an economy's comparative ad-
vantages is a systemic one. It does not simply
rest on the premise that individual venture
capitalists hold a comparative advantage vis-a-
vis banks in financing certain subsets of high
technology. Nor is the condition sufficient that
venture capital must be immobile internation-
ally as a factor of production. This tends to be
so because intensive monitoring and control of
management in investee firms require geo-
graphic proximity, and venture capitalists there-
fore restrict their services not only to domestic
start-ups, but often even to start-ups within their
own home region. More important for our ex-
planation is the hypothesis that a viable venture
capital industry both creates and relies on a
variety of local public goods, making the emer-
gence of a new venture capital industry, or the
further development of an established one, a
systemic event at the national or at the regional
level.
The first instance of a local public good is
related to venture capitalists' desire for syndi-
cated financing contracts. When each indi-
vidual venture capitalist is specialized, syndi-
cation presupposes the existence of other ven-
ture capitalists who have developed a profile of
technological specialization similar to the re-
spective lead venture capitalist. Bygrave (1987,
1988) has suggested that syndication is valued
by venture capitalists primarily because it helps
to establish networks of business contacts
serving to recruit specialists, managers and
engineers into client firms as well as to infor-
mally trade information about best management
practices and technological opportunities
among the participating venture capitalists.
Missing out on that insider knowledge would
deprive a venture capitalist of a critical re-
source. In a competitive environment, venture
capitalists often cannot afford to stay out of a
syndicated network and hence must alternate
between taking the lead and taking a com-
plementary role in co-financing the new tech-
nology-based firms which fall into the cross-
section of a venture capitalist's geographic
neighbourhood and technological domain.
Some degree of synchronizing investments and
of implicitly co-ordinating their technological
specialization may thus benefit groups of ven-
ture capitalists within a regional or national
economy. In theoretical work, Kopp (1999)
explores the private and social benefits of in-
formal communication and co-ordination
through networking of innovators in a patent
race model.
The second local public good is a large and
liquid stock market, which provides the oppor-
tunity for initial public offerings (IPOs) of
common stock, the preferred exit channel for
venture capitalists competing under increasing
returns to their reputation. Besides liquidity in
the stock market, the efficiency of the IPO
process is enhanced by the contributions of in-
termediaries, like investment banks, and of pro-
fessionals, like accountants and lawyers, whose
location decisions seem to depend on agglom-
eration economies related to the size of stock
markets. Black and Gilson (1998) have argued
that IPOs are critical for an efficient venture
capital industry for two main reasons: On the
one hand, IPOs offer the best opportunity for
venture capitalists to build reputational capital
which subsequently helps to attract new funds
from outside investors and start-ups as candi-
dates for screening. On the other hand, even
more important may be that the prospect of
exiting through an IPO improves the entre-
preneur's incentives by allowing the entre-
preneur of the start-up and the venture capitalist
to enter into a self-enforcing implicit contract
over control, which provides for the return of
control from the venture capitalist to a success-
ful entrepreneur upon exit through an IPO.13
Without a liquid stock market, exit could
only be accomplished via a trade sale, with the
corporate purchaser acquiring the controlling
stake which the venture capitalist has held in
the start-up business. It is hence only the pros-
pect of an IPO that can give the entrepreneur
the call option on control which she can choose
to exercise in the event of success (Black and
Gilson 1998: 261). Because an IPO usually re-
sults in a dispersed ownership structure, and
because most venture capitalists agree ex ante
to the termination of their special control rights
at the time of the IPO, even if they retain some
shares for a later sale, the entrepreneur can
often reassume much of the control she origi-
nally ceded to the venture capitalist in exchange
for his financial and non-financial support. It is
in this sense that a liquid stock market, offering
the prospect of raising capital at relatively low
costs through an IPO, facilitates contracting
between venture capitalists and start-up busi-
nesses right from their beginning.
The costs of an IPO to the entrepreneur tend
to decrease with the reputation which the ven-
ture capitalist has already acquired through his
track record of past IPOs. And often, the ven-
ture capitalist's reputational capital benefits his
portfolio firms well before their IPO, namely by
lending credibility when they deal with third
parties, for example in the recruitment of per-
sonnel or with suppliers. As for outside inves-
tors, the publicly observable exit price of an
IPO provides a more reliable measure of the
venture capitalist's skills than could be obtained
from a record of trade sales. Moreover, a regu-
lar exit and reinvestment cycle gives outside
investors the opportunity to withdraw capital
from those venture capitalists who turn out to
be less skilled or whose industry-specific ex-
pertise and technological specialization may
have become obsolete through technological
change.
A third local public good is a local job
market in which venture capital funds can find
the right people to screen, support, develop and
finally divest of high-tech ventures success-
fully. These people must be experts in their
respective area of technology and at the same
time possess the sophisticated management
skills and the specialized knowledge of finan-
cial markets which can only be acquired
through learning-by-doing. It is in this sense
that an emerging venture capital industry can-
not simply rely on, but must build a supportive
local job market itself. This is a cause of local-
ization familiar from the very high-tech indus-
tries which venture capital primarily supports,
whose entrepreneurs often base their own local-
ization choices on the availability of a pool of
specialized research and engineering skills.
There are thus several theoretical grounds to
expect that an open economy's comparative ad-
vantage from venture capital lies in high-tech
industries whose firms tend to cluster together
geographically. Moreover, venture capital itself
is likely to be one of the centripetal forces in
this clustering, because its active involvement
in investee's management limits the geographic
space within which each individual venture
capitalist can operate, and because the strategic
choices of competing venture capitalists are in-
terdependent.
What we have sketched here is a multi-
dimensional explanation of venture capital's
role in shaping an economy's comparative ad-
vantages in specific high-technology industries.
This explanation effectively links the dynamics
of venture capital and specialization to a his-
torical process driven by dynamic scale
economies akin to learning-by-doing in infant-
industry models of international trade (Schertler
1999). And this, of course, implies that there
may be scope in principle to enhance an econ-
omy's welfare through targeted support for
venture capital.
2 The Specialization of Venture
Capitalists: Evidence
In this section, we check the available data from
four major venture capital markets for evidence
on our hypotheses linking technological spe-
cialization to the efficiency of venture capital-
ists. In comparing the US, British, Dutch and
German venture capital markets, we also seek
to identify empirical determinants of different
national patterns of technological specialization14
in the venture capital industry. The European
data are from the European Venture Capital As-
sociation (EVCA 1991-96), which assembles
data from the member statistics of the various
national venture capital associations; because
reputation is paramount in the venture capital
industry, members should normally have strong
incentives to provide accurate data. The United
States has the oldest, largest and most deeply
developed venture capital market of all. In pro-
portion to GDP, however, the British venture
capital market has nominally reached an even
larger size, but much of it is in fact devoted to
management buyouts (MBOs) and buyins
(MBIs) and does not fall under our restricted
definition of venture capital. Both MBOs and
MBIs enable managers to acquire an established
business, but in an MBO, these managers are
from within the firm whereas in an MBI, they
come in from outside. The German and Dutch
venture capital markets are still relatively small,
after growing steadily only since the early
1990s.
Compared to Europe, US venture capitalists
concentrate a larger share of their investments
on high-tech industries where young firms
primarily invest in intangible capital, and where
we expect credit restrictions to be of particular
importance. The higher degree of specialization
by US venture capitalists should result not only
in a higher total rate of return, adjusted for risk,
but also in a higher risk-adjusted rate of return
at each financing stage. Unfortunately, the ex
ante risks that venture capitalists face cannot be
observed, and data on rates of return are avail-
able only at a fairly aggregate level. Moreover,
country-specific patterns of venture capitalists'
specialization need not be entirely due to the
hypotheses discussed above. In Europe, and
particularly in Germany, many venture capital-
ists are subsidiaries of a parent company, either
a bank or an industrial firm, nurturing spin-offs
from in-house research or cultivating external
innovations that complement the firm's own
line of products. These dependent or semi-
dependent venture capitalists (also called cap-
tives and semi-captives, respectively) may
enjoy neither the discretion nor the incentive to
specialize on a narrow subset of high technol-
ogy in the same way as fully independent ven-
ture capitalists do. For only the independent
venture capitalists can expect to appropriate the
returns to reputational capital which they may
gain from technological specialization.
2.1 Financing Constraints
Our theoretical discussion has pointed out that
without financing constraints in credit markets,
venture capital would find it very difficult to
recommend itself as a financial intermediary for
new technology-based firms. After all, why
should any young entrepreneur agree to share
her profits with a venture capitalist if she could
easily obtain a bank credit and keep the profits
to herself? Despite their general plausibility,
however, it is far from self-evident that credit
constraints are more important for small firms
than for large firms and particularly important
for high-tech start-ups. Yet, it is this asymmetry
of credit constraints on which our specialization
hypothesis for venture capital depends. More-
over, since we are addressing the specialization
of venture capital in open economies, we must
also ask: What is the comparative evidence for
credit constraints in different countries? And:
Have economists identified characteristics of
national financial systems that can help explain
the variance of financing constraints, of which
we suppose that they exist?
Empirical studies of the existence and conse-
quences of credit constraints usually resort to
indirect methods, because data on rejected or
withheld loan applications are rarely available.
But survey evidence clearly supports the pre-
sumption that high-tech start-ups face particular
financing constraints (Moore 1994; Westhead
and Storey 1997). The same conclusion is sug-
gested by econometric studies which have
shown that the use of external debt increases
with the tangibility of a firm's assets (Friend
and Lang 1988; Rajan and Zingales 1995). In
order to find more precise and more specific
evidence, the literature has pursued two main
strategies. One of these assumes that a positive
impact of a firm's cash flow on R&D and other
investment decisions indicates credit con-
straints. The argument is that without credit15
constraints, these investment decisions would
only be determined by market prospects and
opportunity costs, factors which are largely ex-
ternal to the individual firm. The other empiri-
cal strategy assumes that an above-average use
of trade credit indicates credit constraints, be-
cause trade credit tends to be the most expen-
sive form of external finance and would be
avoided if cheaper and longer-term credits were
available from banks.
Based on the incidence of trade credit,
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find evidence that
small firms in the United States are indeed
credit-constrained, and that these constraints
decline with a firm's age and with a stable re-
lationship to a small number of banks. For
German data, Harhoff and Kbrting (1998) find
that older firms use relatively less trade credit
than younger firms, confirming the presumption
that credit constraints decrease with firm age in
Germany. Moreover, they also provide evi-
dence that the cost of credit tend to be higher
for fast-growing small firms than for more
stable firms in Germany. As for Britain, Hughes
(1997) confirms that small firms make rela-
tively more use of trade credits than large firms.
Based on the impact of cash flow on invest-
ment, Fazzari et al. (1988) also find evidence of
credit constraints, but for large as well as small
firms. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) find
cash flow to be a significant determinant of
R&D investments in a panel of 179 small high-
tech firms in the United States. For Germany,
Harhoff (1998) uses basically the same ap-
proach to show that R&D decisions in small
German firms are also sensitive to cash flow. In
a comparative study of British and German
firms, Bond et al. (1999) find that fixed invest-
ment in British firms is sensitive to cash flow,
but not in German firms. However, they do not
find evidence that firms' R&D is sensitive to
cash flow in either country.
Differential credit constraints for small and
large firms are consistent with the incidence of
venture capital in the different countries we
have looked at. In the United States, there are
not only evident credit constraints for high-tech
start-ups, but also great opportunities for ven-
ture capitalists who can rely on a highly pro-
ductive investment banking industry to serve as
underwriters for IPOs on the world's largest
and most liquid stock market. In Germany, on
the other hand, the stock market is much less
developed, domestic investment banks are still
in their infancy, and due to state banking and
the wide spread of public saving and loan insti-
tutions, credit constraints appear to be less
severe than in Britain, for example. Britain's
financial system lacks the municipal saving and
loan institutions which largely finance the
German "Mittelstand" and, despite its liquid
stock market, also differs from the US system
because Britain lacks a domestic investment
banking industry of the same quality as that in
the United States. This may provide a partial
explanation of why the attention and resources
of British venture capitalists have been diverted
from their natural domain of nurturing high-
tech start-ups and are instead largely devoted to
late-stage deals, including MBOs and MBIs,
which are the domain of investment banks in
the United States.
Finally, there is evidence that even a well-
developed venture capital industry, like that in
the United States, cannot provide a first-best
solution and remove all the financing con-
straints which are due to the high uncertainty
and asymmetric distribution of information
characterizing technological innovation. In par-
ticular, empirical proxies for typical agency
problems remain significant explanatory vari-
ables for the differential use of contractual
covenants in venture capital relationships even
when proxies for supply and demand conditions
are taken into account (Gompers and Lerner
1999).
2.2 Specialization: An International
Comparison
As a reflection of the different financial systems
in which venture capitalists operate, there are
sharp differences in their main sources of capi-
tal. And since a venture capital fund's main
source of capital usually determines whether it
is a dependent or an independent fund, it also
determines venture capitalists' incentives to
pursue a strategy of technological specializa-16
Figure 1: Capital Commitments by Type of Investor (percentage shares 1986-1995)
36
United States United Kingdom Germany
I Corporations ID Pension Funds • Insurance/Banks
Netherlands
! Families/Institutions
Note: Volumes are deflated with the GDP (expenditure) price indices (1990=100). — Capital
commitments by type of investor are summed up over the years 1986 to 1995 and divided by
the total capital commitments.
Source: NVCA 1996; EVCA 1992, 1994a, 1996. GDP price indices are from OECD (1999).
tion. Besides corporations, it is banks which
predominantly invest in dependent funds, so
that there is a significant difference between a
venture capital system dominated by banks and
one dominated by pension funds. The main in-
vestors can only be identified on the basis of
new funding activity, because data on main in-
vestors based on total cumulative funds' vol-
umes are not available. Capital commitments in
each category of investors are summed up over
the years 1986 to 1995 and divided by the total
sum of new funds (Figure 1).
Corporate investors often intend to partici-
pate in innovative firms in order to acquire new
technologies, to enter new markets or to diver-
sify their product range; unlike pension fund
investors, they are not primarily concerned with
the financial returns to their venture invest-
ments, but rather with optimizing their overall
technology portfolio. For example, many Ger-
man banks holding private equity shares are
motivated by a desire to offer a full range of
financing opportunities to firms and to raise the
joint revenue from all bank services together. In
order to separate credit transactions and equity
transactions, many German banks have started
subsidiaries managing portfolios of equity
shares in unlisted firms.
In the United States, pension funds' capital
became a significant factor in the growth of the
venture capital market after a revision of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) in 1979 allowed US pension funds to
invest substantial amounts of capital into risky
funds, including venture capital. Pension funds
have also been an important source of venture
capital in the United Kingdom; in 1995, they
provided almost 45 per cent of all new funds. In
Germany and in the Netherlands, pension funds
have played a smaller role. The activity of pen-
sion funds has been very volatile in the Nether-
lands, and in Germany, pension funds commit-
ted capital only in 1987/88 and 1995. In Ger-
many, the major sources of venture capital have
been banks followed by corporations. Over the
1986-1995 period, about 51 per cent of new
funds were committed by banks, more than in
any of the other three economies considered
here. Families and non-profit institutions have
never been major participants in the European
venture capital markets, whereas about 10 per
cent of the new funds have been raised from
this source in the United States.
Summing up, venture capital commitments
are dominated by banks in Germany and to a
lesser degree also in the Netherlands. In the
United States, pension funds have established
themselves as the main source of capital, a
trend which appears to have caught pension
funds in the United Kingdom in recent years. In17
fact, pensions funds in the United Kingdom
may even become the dominant source of UK
venture capital in the near future.
Cumulative Funds
Since the early 1990s, the total volume of cu-
mulative funds, the sum of inflows of funds
without any adjustment for divestments, has
grown in all four venture capital markets ex-
amined here (Figure 2). However, their size
relative to gross domestic products (GDP) and
stock market capitalization (SMC) still differs
sharply (Table 1).







Note: Volumes, in million local currency, are deflated with the GDP (expenditure)
price indices (1990=100) and thereafter converted into ECU using year-average
exchange rates.
Source: EVCA 1991-1995; NVCA 1991-1995. Exchange rates are from IMF (1999). GDP price indices are from OECD
(1999).

































































Source: Volumes of cumulative funds are from EVCA 1991-1995 and NVCA 1991-1995. SMC data are from World Bank
(1999). Exchange rates are from IMF (1999). GDP data are from OECD (1999).18
Relative to GDP, the British venture capital
market is the biggest at around 2 per cent, and
the German market the smallest at only a tenth
of the relative size of the British market, while
the Dutch venture capital market occupies an
intermediate position. Notice, however, that
the Dutch market has failed to grow in terms of
relative size from 1991 to 1995, while the
other three have increased their relative size by
a quarter during this period. It may seem sur-
prising that the US venture capital market's
relative size is only about a quarter of the
British market, but this is largely due to differ-
ent definitions of venture capital. Our US
figures only cover independent private funds,
excluding capital commitments to portfolio
companies working under the Small Business
Investment Company (SBIC) act, family
groups and corporate affiliates. Independent
funds are not legally linked to a parent com-
pany; they are mostly structured as limited
partnerships, where the limited partners pro-
vide only capital, leaving the management to
the general partner. Among the limited part-
ners, insurance companies, pension funds, cor-
porations and wealthy individuals are pre-
dominant. The European figures comprise in-
dependent, captive and semi-captive funds.
An important difference between dependent
and independent funds lies in the different
quality of their management support services.
While the managers of independent funds are
often former entrepreneurs with hands-on ex-
perience of starting their own high-technology
venture, the managers of dependent funds
mostly have a background in banking. Com-
pared to these, the typical manager of an inde-
pendent fund comes with many more personal
contacts to other venture capitalists, financial
agents and technologists both in the venture
capital industry and in its client firms. We
therefore believe that the non-financial ser-
vices provided by independent fund managers
tend to be of a higher quality than those pro-
vided by dependent fund managers. Moreover,
not only the initial reputation, but also the in-
centive to build reputational capital will be
higher for managers of independent funds.
The cumulative funds' relative size with re-
spect to national stock market capitalization
(SMC) captures the significance of venture
capital for an economy's financial market. Ac-
cording to this measure, venture capital again
appears to play a much more significant role in
the British financial system than in the US
system. Since the Dutch and, especially, the
German stock markets are still small relative to
the size of these economies, it is not surprising
that their venture capital industries, too, appear
to play a larger role in the equity markets of
these countries than venture capital plays in the
United States.
A look at annual venture capital investments
and divestments during the 1991-1995 period,
which is given in Table 2, confirms the general
impression that relative to the size of the econ-
omy, venture capital plays a smaller role in the
two largest economies, the United States and
Germany, with the Netherlands occupying an
intermediate position. The United Kingdom,
with its broader definition of venture capital
and its particularly large stock market, again
stands out. Annual divestment rates, which are
only given for the three European countries, do
not show any great surprises. They have al-
ways remained well below the annual invest-
ments rates, confirming the strong growth of
the venture capital industry in all these coun-
tries. Graphic illustrations of these trends are
given in Figures 3 and 4.
In general, however, these statistical as-
sessments of the importance of venture capital
markets have to be interpreted with some cau-
tion, because mere volumes of cumulative
funds and annual investment rates provide no
information about the success or failure of
venture capital in financing fast-growing high-
tech business start-ups, i.e. no information
about the efficiency of venture capital. But
there is other evidence to which we now turn.19




























































Source: Volumes of investments and divestments are from EVCA 1991-1995 and NVCA 1991-1995. GDP data are from
OECD (1999).
Figure 3: Annual Volumes of Investments
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
• United States QD United Kingdom • Germany & Netherlands
Note: Volumes, in million local currency, are deflated with the GDP (expenditure)
price indices (1990=100) and thereafter converted into ECU using year-average
exchange rates.
Source: Volumes of investments are from EVCA 1991-1995 and NVCA 1991-1995. Exchange rates are from IMF (1999).
GDP price indices are from OECD (1999).20





I Germany §§ Netherlands
Note: Volumes, in million local currency, are deflated with the GDP (expenditure)
price indices (1990=100) and thereafter converted into ECU using year-average
exchange rates.
Source: Volumes of divestments are from EVCA 1991-1995. Exchange rates are from IMF (1999). GDP price indices are
from OECD (1999).
Venture Capital Investments: Characteristics
and Stages
Our central hypothesis that venture capitalists
tend to specialize on industries with a high
share of intangible investments is supported by
a variety of empirical indicators. Over the ten-
year period from 1986 to 1995, the bulk of the
world's venture capital investments has flown
into four industries which are distinguished by a
particularly high share of intangible capital and
have seen strong growth in output, namely
computer-related software and hardware, bio-
technology, communication technologies and
the medical and health-related industry. For the
total 1986-1995 period, the percentage distri-
bution of venture capital disbursements to these
industries in the United States, the Netherlands,
Britain and Germany is summarized in Fig-
ure 5. The differences between countries are
striking.
In the United States, approximately 60 per
cent of total venture capital investments went
into the four high-tech industries mentioned, in
the European economies only a quarter. Al-
though investments into the computer-related
industry held the largest share in all countries,
the size of this share varied widely, between a
quarter of total venture capital investments in
the United States and only about 5 per cent in
the United Kingdom. None of the European
economies come even close to the high infor-
mation technology and science orientation of
the United States. Moreover, recent disburse-
ment trends suggest that the European venture
capital industry is developing its own distinct
profile of specialization. In the United King-
dom, for example, the proportion of invest-
ments into the medical and health-related in-
dustry has increased over the observation pe-
riod and reached more than 8 per cent in 1995.
In the German data, there is a marked break
after the unification in 1990. Before unification,
the computer-related industry accounted for
about a quarter of all venture capital invest-
ments, the volume of which was still relatively
small. From 1990 onwards, the volume of total
venture capital investments increased sharply,
but the share which went into the computer-re-
lated industry decreased to 4 per cent. In fact,
the computer-related industry has seen a decline
after unification even in terms of absolute
values, which has begun to be reversed only
five years later, at an 8 per cent share in 1995.
This sequence of events is consistent with our21









Note: Values are deflated with the GDP (expenditure) price indices (1990=100), and
thereafter disbursements by industries are summed up over the years 1986 to 1995 and
divided by the respective total disbursement.
Source: NVCA 1996; EVCA 1992, 1994a, 1996. GDP price indices are from OECD (1999).
interpretation in the sense that unification, in
addition to the creation of the single European
market and the prospect of European Monetary
Union, opened many new investment oppor-
tunities, which in turn attracted new people to
the venture capital industry. Only as some of
these people have succeeded in accumulating
reputational capital have they become ready to
specialize on investments into those subsets of
high technology, like the computer-related in-
dustry, where financing constraints are pre-
sumed to be most important. Thus, the change
of technological targeting observed for German
venture capitalists after unification provides a
vivid illustration of our main theme.
Our data also contains evidence on venture
capitalists' specialization across the stages in
the life of portfolio firms. Of course, speciali-
zation is not the only reason that venture capi-
talists' support varies across the development
stages of the recipient firms. The most basic
reason is the firms' stage-dependent demand for
external finance. For statistical purposes, the
following three financing stages are often dis-
tinguished:
- Early-stage financing: The early stage,
which can last between six months and five
years, depending on the industry, comprises
the seed stage and the start-up stage of a new
business. In the seed stage, typically lasting
less than one year, the initial business con-
cept is formed and prototypes of the new
product are developed and compared with
competing products in the market. In the
start-up stage, production is set up and a first
marketing campaign is launched, to which
the market reaction is carefully analyzed.
Funding in the start-up stage is particularly
risky and requires larger amounts of capital
than in the seed stage; it is in the start-up
stage that venture capitalists come into their
own.
- Expansion-stage financing: The expansion
stage often requires very large amounts of
external funding, because sales do not yet
generate enough liquidity for a full internal
financing of the firm's growth. Venture capi-
tal is usually provided in several rounds.
- Late-stage financing: This category compri-
ses a number of distinct cases of capital in-
jections for established firms: Turnaround22
financing, management buyouts (MBO),
management buy ins (MB I) and leveraged
buyouts (LBO). These are for firms in crisis,
for the acquisition of an existing business by
its own management and for the takeover of
privately held firms. At this stage, venture
capitalists often provide debt finance, mostly
in the form of convertible debentures, instead
of equity only.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of venture
capital investments across these three financing
stages. In the United States, almost one third of
investments went into the early stage and a
further 50 per cent into the expansion stage.
This is in sharp contrast to the UK market,
where more than 60 per cent of investments
went into the late stage, with a particular em-
phasis on MBOs, and only 3 per cent into the
early stage. The venture capital markets in
Germany and the Netherlands held an inter-
mediate position, allocating most of their in-
vestments to the expansion stage. These data
clearly highlight the different quality of venture
capital in the different countries. Even if the
MBO/MBI-funding activities of British venture
capitalists were excluded, because most of them
are not devoted to new technology-based firms,
only 29 per cent of the British venture capital
investments went into high-tech industries in
1991, compared to 83 per cent in the United
States (Murray and Lott 1995). It appears that
British venture capitalists have taken on financ-
ings which are normally done by other inter-
mediaries in most economies.
Compared to Britain, a larger share of Dutch
and German venture capital actually finds its
way into high-tech start-ups. Compared to the
United States, however, the much smaller
Dutch and German shares of venture capital in-
vestments into the early stage are striking.
These relatively small shares are consistent with
our theoretical suggestion that the Dutch and
German venture capitalists still need time to
learn and build the reputational capital that will
enhance their efficiency and make them com-
petitive as early-stage investors without further
subsidies. According to our theory, the high
share of early-stage investments in the United
States is evidence of the US venture capital in-
dustry's maturity. For a similar view, see







































• Late J stage
Note: Values are deflated with the GDP (expenditure) price indices (1990=
100), and thereafter stage investments are summed up over the years 1990 to
1995 and divided by the total investments.
Early stage includes seed and start-up (European economies) or seed, start-up
and other early-stage investments (United States). Late stage includes LBO
(United States) or MBO/MBI (European economies).
Source: NVCA 1996; EVCA 1992, 1994a, 1996. GDP price indices are from OECD (1999).23
Gompers and Lerner (1999), who report inter-
nationally comparable figures for early-stage
investments of venture capital in 1995, based
on Jeng and Wells (1998). These figures in-
dicate a volume of US$ 3,374 million in prices
of 1997 for the United States, of 116 million for
Germany, of 100 million for the Netherlands
and of only 36 million for the United Kingdom.
2.3 Performance Measurement and
Divestment Opportunities
Our theoretical discussion has suggested that a
higher degree of technological specialization by
individual venture capitalists should not only
lead to a higher total rate of return as well as a
higher rate of return at each of the different
financing stages in general, but to a more pro-
nounced efficiency gain at the early financing
stages in particular. Because many US venture
capitalists are already more experienced and
more strongly specialized on narrow subsets of
high technology, we expect that they have real-
ized both a higher total rate of return and a
higher rate of return to early-stage investments.
The most common performance measure for
venture capital investments is the internal rate
of return (IRR). It is defined as the discounting
rate for which the present value of all future
outflows equals the present value of all future
inflows which a venture capitalist generates
over time. This measure expresses the annual
rate of return as a simple percentage and makes
it easy to compare investments. But because the
measure is unidimensional, it gives no infor-
mation about the ex ante risk or the ex post
volatility of the returns to a specific investment.
Ideally, the IRR should be calculated only after
a venture capitalist has exited from all his
equity participations, because the capital gains
upon exit through a trade sale or an IPO are
usually the main return to his investments. But
at any point in time, many participations are
still in the venture capitalist's portfolio, and
there are even recent entrants to the venture
capital industry who have not yet exited from
any of their investments. At a practical level,
three variants of the ex post IRR are distin-
guished: The gross return on realized invest-
ments, the gross return on all investments and
the net return to the outside investor (EVCA
1994b)
1. Both gross levels of the IRR are calcu-
lated before the deduction of management fees,
carried interests and other charges. The gross
return on all investments even includes the en-
tire unrealized portion of investments, the value
of which has to be estimated. However, a com-
parison of the gross return on all investments
and the net return to outside investors gives
only a vague indication of the cost-effective-
ness of venture capitalists but reveals little in-
formation about the efficiency of venture capi-
talists as financial intermediaries. Table 3 gives
the total IRR on venture capital investments and
the IRR on investments in different financing
stages for the United States, the United King-
dom and the Netherlands.
Even at this aggregate level, the data on IRR
lend support to our hypothesis that the more
technologically specialized venture capitalists,
who are prominent in the United States, achieve
a better performance with early-stage invest-
ments. Funds which have invested in the early
stage in the United States have realized a higher
IRR than comparable funds in the United King-
dom and, for that matter, in the Netherlands,
where the IRR has even been negative. How-
ever, the Dutch IRR for early-stage investments
is not directly comparable, because, unlike the
The EVCA (1994a) bases its calculation of the IRR
on the following equation:




where IRR denotes the yearly internal rate of return,
OUT, represents the yearly outflow, NAVN is the net
asset value of the unrealized portfolio in the year N,





is treated as part of the financial cash inflow. Using
the net cash flow, which is defined as NCFi = INt -
OUTi, the equation takes the following form:
.=0 (1 + IRR)
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 c"Balanced" denotes funds which
' are funds which do not specialize on a financing stage.
Source: NVP (1997).
US and UK IRRs, it is not based on the total net
IRRs of funds investing predominantly in the
early stage, but on the IRRs of early-stage in-
vestments by mixed funds. Likewise, the Dutch
IRR for late-stage investments includes also all
investments in the expansion stage. A break-
down of the time series shows that the negative
Dutch IRR in the early stage is based on a
period of unsuccessful venture capital financing
from 1986 to 1992 with an IRR of -8 % and a
period of somewhat more successful, but still
disappointing, venture capital financing from
1993 to 1996 with an IRR of 3 %. Intriguingly,
the unsuccessful period was a time of heavy-
handed government support for venture capital
through the "Particuliere Participatiemaat-
schappijen" (PPM) guarantee scheme, which
will be discussed below. Although the US and
the UK total IRRs are net of management fees
and other charges, they are still higher than the
total gross IRR for the Netherlands. The total
UK IRR would be less than the US IRR if man-
agement buyouts were not included in the IRR
calculation.
For Germany, only a gross return on a num-
ber of individual investments made during the
1970s and 1980s is available (Schefczyk 1998).
In this survey with 88 observations, the most
successful venture capital investment had an
average annual IRR of 111 %, while the least
successful venture capital investment realized a
negative IRR of -22.5 %. Altogether, an aver-
age IRR of 18.5 % was realized, while the
median IRR was only 15 %.
Our hypothesis, that the exit of venture capi-
talists via an IPO is their best strategy to build
reputational capital, is supported by the obser-
vation that IRRs vary systematically across exit
channels. For example, Dutch venture capital-
ists realized an IRR of 32 % through IPOs,
16 % through trade sales and only 7 % through
buybacks by the portfolio firms' founders.
Moreover, a variety of empirical observa-
tions support our theoretical suggestion that
venture capitalists choose the exit channel stra-
tegically, and that they build their reputation
primarily through successful IPOs. In the
United States, for example, young venture
capitalists tend to raise capital sooner after a
successful IPO, the amount of capital raised de-
pends more strongly on the number of previ-
ously backed IPOs, and at their IPO, the firms
backed by a young venture capitalist tend to be
younger themselves than those backed by es-
tablished venture capitalists (Gompers and
Lerner 1999). But within a given economy,
venture capitalists' choice may be constrained
by a limited set of available exit opportunities
and by prevailing market conditions. An IPO
presupposes a large, liquid and prudently regu-
lated stock market, while a trade sale presup-
poses the existence of a corporate purchaser,
with deep pockets, wishing to acquire the newly
developed technology from a venture as a
strategic asset. This usually means that a related
industry must already be established.
The literature indeed provides evidence that
an exit via IPO is chosen with greater probabil-25
Table 4: Divestments by Channels (volumes in million ECU and percentage shares 1991-1995)
Total Divestments
Sales
Trade sales as a percentage of
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Note: Volumes, in million local currency, have been deflated with the GDP
verted into ECU using year-average exchange rates and thereafter summed up
tage shares, volumes are deflated with the GDP (expenditure) price indices (
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(expenditure) price indices (1990=100), con-
over the years 1991 tc) 1995. — For percen-
1990=100), summed up for each divestment
for all channels.
Source: EVCA 1992, 1994a, 1996; BVK 1992-1995. Exchange rates are from IMF (1999). GDP price indices are from
OECD (1999).
ity when the liquidity in the stock market is
high (Lerner 1994b), that a larger venture capi-
tal share in the ownership of a firm prior to its
IPO leads to lower underpricing (Megginson
and Weiss 1991) and that common stock from
venture capital-backed IPOs outperforms stock
from non-venture capital-backed IPOs in the
long term (Brav and Gompers 1997). Barry et
al. (1990) provide evidence that a higher quality
of monitoring, measured by the age of the lead
venture capitalist, the length of time served on
the board of his portfolio firm and the number
of his prior IPOs, explains lower underpricing.
On the basis of these econometric findings,
we can draw some tentative conclusions on the
quality of European venture capital by looking
at data on divestments by channel during the
1991-1995 period, which are summarized in
Table 4. The total divestments can be separated
into divestments by write-off, in case of partial
or total failure, and divestments by elected exit
channels, in case of success. Furthermore, the
proportion of the two exit channels mainly
elected in case of success, trade sales and IPOs,
are given.
By volume, German total divestments were
about a quarter of British total divestments. In
the United Kingdom, the total value of divest-
ments was approximately five billion ECU over
the period 1991 to 1995. But in the Nether-
lands, the total value was much lower at
911 million ECU. In the United Kingdom, al-
most 90 per cent of the total divestments were
realized by trade sale and IPO. In the Nether-
lands, only 55 per cent of the total divestments
were realized by these channels, in Germany 48
per cent. In Germany, a significant proportion
was divested via a buyback and a secondary
purchase, the purchase of shares by another
venture capitalist or any other private share-
holder.
In the United States (NVCA 1996), capital
worth ECU 17.141 billion was raised by ven-
ture capital-backed IPOs over the period 1991—
1995 with 783 firms sold over this period.
About 722 enterprises went public in the United
Kingdom over the period 1991-1995, and the
volume of IPOs was ECU 1.972 billion. Com-
pared with the United States, the capital raised
through a venture capital-backed IPO was much




Policy Implications of Venture Capital
Theory
The policy implications of our theoretical dis-
cussion can be summarized as follows. Effi-
ciency requires that venture capitalists compete
on the basis of reputational capital which they
seek to build through a record of successful di-
vestments of portfolio firms in the stock market.
Helping venture capitalists to build reputational
capital in the domestic market should be the
government's primary concern. A higher repu-
tation of individual venture capitalists and of
the domestic venture capital industry as a whole
will have two beneficial effects: First, it will
encourage new technology-based firms to seek
the financial and non-financial support offered
by venture capitalists, and second, it will entice
domestic and foreign capital providers to inject
funds into the domestic venture capital industry.
Empirically, the efficiency of a venture
capital industry is captured by the speed with
which the accumulation of reputational capital
lowers the degree of underpricing in IPOs of
young technology-based firms. Underpricing
refers to the difference between the price at
which the IPO is offered and the (usually
higher) price at which the stock is subsequently
quoted publicly for the first time. Underpricing
occurs when outside investors demand a dis-
count for taking the risk of buying new stock
for which no price history can be observed.
Lower underpricing means that venture capital-
ists and owner entrepreneurs can appropriate a
larger share of the social returns to their origi-
nal investment. A reputable venture capitalist
will thus become a more attractive partner for
future start-ups in his area of technological ex-
pertise. And he may leverage some of his en-
hanced reputation to begin screening and in-
vesting at an earlier stage of firm formation
where both the risks and the potential returns
are larger. Ultimately, this raises the social
efficiency of venture capital because promising
new ventures will be sped along sooner while
some of the wasteful adventures of entrepre-
neurial hypocrites may be terminated earlier.
The least controversial way of helping ven-
ture capitalists in their effort to build a reputa-
tion is to encourage and promote the prudent
regulation of special stock market segments for
young technology-based firms. Because these
firms pose special valuation problems beyond
those that bedevil the IPOs of more conven-
tional firms, regulations should be particularly
stringent with respect to accounting require-
ments for intangible assets, disclosure rules and
insider behaviour. The goal must be to mini-
mize the risk that an isolated case of bankruptcy
soon after an IPO would frighten outside inves-
tors away by making them prejudiced against
all domestic IPOs with a venture capital back-
ing. It is because informational asymmetries are
endemic and because syndication is the rule in
venture financing that outside investors may not
be able to discriminate efficiently between
those venture capitalists who share responsibil-
ity for a failure and those who do not. Even if
triggered by one or a few spectacular failures
only, a loss of confidence may be persistent and
may jeopardize the prospects of raising capital
through an IPO for all domestic players there-
after, whether they are young technology-based
firms or venture capitalists.
As a consequence, the government must first
and foremost avoid all policies that might hin-
der the build-up of reputational capital. For ex-
ample, discriminatory taxation of capital gains
realized through an IPO or a trade sale should
be avoided. In particular, if stock options were
not taxed as income or as a capital gain before
the underlying stock is eventually sold, holders
would not be forced into a premature exercise
of their options. And this would preserve stock
options' unique value for start-ups, which pri-
marily stems from the fact that it provides an
affordable means to attract highly qualified
specialists and, once they are employed, to mo-
tivate them and align their personal pecuniary
interests with the long-term objectives of the
firm. In similar vein, all labour market regula-
tions that hinder the free flow of skilled special-
ists into and among high-tech start-ups should
be relaxed, since bringing the right people into27
the right place is an important part of venture
capitalists' non-financial services. In many
countries, the removal of labour market con-
straints on the venture capital industry should
include the removal of barriers to the immigra-
tion of foreign specialists in areas of technology
held back by a domestic shortage of skills.
Moreover, bankruptcy laws in many countries
will have to be reformed to make it easier for
failed entrepreneurs to get a second chance,
denial of which has all too often wasted their
learning from experience in the past. Finally,
the ability of the domestic venture capital
industry to establish a reputation for high-qual-
ity IPOs may be adversely affected by overly
generous subsidies or public investment guaran-
tees.
Although subsidies may initially increase the
volume of funds that an emerging venture
capital industry can invest during its infancy,
they are likely to discourage venture capitalists
from fully taking into account the effects of
their investment decisions and other activities
on their own long-term reputation. For exam-
ple, investment guarantees may encourage
venture capitalists to be less careful in their
monitoring of investment decisions in portfolio
firms, and this may increase the moral hazard in
these decisions. In similar vein, subsidies and
investment guarantees may discourage venture
capitalists from screening new technology-
based firms as carefully as they can, thus in-
creasing the risk of adverse selection in their
choice of portfolio firms. Moreover, many
venture capitalists will be able to expand the
number of their investments only by taking on
board less qualified personnel, thus further
compromising their reputation for high-quality
non-financial services. Ad valorem subsidies, in
particular, may entice venture capitalists to
provide a larger volume of finance up front so
as to obtain a larger subsidy, but this will
undermine the strategy of staging which has
been shown to reduce moral hazard and adverse
selection effectively (Gompers 1995). Thus,
even if subsidies raise the overall volume of
funds flowing into the domestic venture capital
industry, they may be dynamically inefficient
because they may hinder the build-up of reputa-
tion and may actually lower the quality of the
non-financial services proffered by venture
capitalists. These non-financial services, how-
ever, are crucial for the efficiency of venture
capital as an institution of financial intermedia-
tion.
Most government subsidies for venture
capital are awarded either as a subsidized loan
or as an investment guarantee. The distinction
between these two subsidy schemes matters be-
cause of their different incentive effects. In
order to rank these in terms of efficiency, we
must not only assess how the different schemes
affect the investment behaviour of start-ups; but
also how the different schemes affect the ven-
ture capitalist's efforts to screen candidates for
investment and to subsequently monitor and
control his portfolio firms. The start-up firm
will be directly affected only if it is the re-
cipient of the subsidy. For example, if it di-
rectly receives a subsidized loan and if this
means that the start-up can do with a reduced
share of venture capital in its external capital,
incentives for the start-up may actually im-
prove, because its capital structure will move
away from equity-only towards a mix of debt
and equity, which is more likely to lower the
total agency cost of both debt and equity
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). With partial debt
finance, the entrepreneur's profit share in case
of success will be higher than with all external
finance in the form of equity or equivalent fi-
nancial instruments. On the other hand, the in-
centives for the venture capitalist to provide
managerial support may be correspondingly re-
duced. Moreover, even the venture capitalist's
incentives for screening may be reduced if he
knows that a public creditor will step in and
share the risk of failure. This, in turn, may
tempt the venture capitalist to seek additional
ventures in which a relatively small stake held
by his fund is complemented by a government
loan. However, the wider spread and lower
quality of the venture capitalist's non-financial
services, which this may imply, will likely re-
sult in slower learning and in a slower build-up
of reputational capital, which may be dynami-
cally inefficient.28
By contrast, if the loan is given to the venture
capitalist and is used to increase the volume of
his equity shares in each of a given number of
new ventures, his incentives for screening and
monitoring may even improve. Not only is his
stake in each venture now higher, but so are his
private costs should an individual venture fail,
because he remains liable for serving his debt to
the government unless his entire fund fails.
Only if the venture capitalist has special insider
knowledge about correlations between the pro-
spective returns from different ventures, can he
deliberately choose a combination of projects
which raises the variance of their combined re-
turns at the expense of the government's ex-
pected return on its credit. On the other hand,
the additional capital from a government loan
may tempt the venture capitalist to participate
in additional ventures, leaving the size of each
venture constant. The additional ventures would
then most likely have risk-return prospects in-
ferior to those ventures he would finance with-
out government help. Moreover, the venture
capitalist would have to spread his limited
monitoring capacity over a larger number of
ventures, resulting in a lower quality of moni-
toring and control of each individual venture.
But, of course, the venture capitalist may also
choose to increase the number of ventures un-
der contract and at the same time raise his
screening and monitoring efforts, which would
best serve the government's goal to increase the
size of the venture capital industry and to en-
hance a dynamically efficient learning process.
Unfortunately, there is much less reason to
believe in such a lucky outcome if the govern-
ment extends its support for the venture capital
industry via investment guarantees for indi-
vidual ventures. Under such a guarantee
scheme, the venture capitalist's incentives for
screening and monitoring will almost certainly
be reduced, even if the guarantee covers only
part of the venture capitalist's investment. For
in the case of success, the venture capitalist will
share in the venture's profits, but in the case of
failure, he will not fully bear the losses. Hence,
he will care less about potential failures which
the entrepreneur herself risks by choosing to
invest in a manner that promises a particularly
high expected return to herself at the expense of
a higher variance of returns and a higher prob-
ability of failure. The government guarantee,
perversely, helps to align the venture capital-
ist's interest with that of his investee without
solving the adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. In the short term, the venture capital-
ist may even be able to increase the volume of
his investments by luring additional outside in-
vestors into the guaranteed profit opportunity.
In the long term, however, the lack of learning
by the venture capitalist will deter future con-
tributions by outside investors and will likely
result in a dynamically inefficient development
of the venture capital industry.
Because guarantees directly reduce the
weight given to potential losses in the venture
capitalist's allocation decision, the moral hazard
created by a government guarantee tends to be
worse than that created by a loan scheme. A
loan scheme is likely to create the same sort of
moral hazard only if the loans are given directly
to the portfolio firm, but then the moral hazard
is likely to be partially offset by improved in-
centives for the entrepreneur. These come about
because loans given directly to the portfolio
firm tend to reduce the total agency costs by
moving the portfolio firm's capital structure
towards one which rewards the entrepreneur's
own effort more generously. Finally, under a
loan scheme in which the venture capitalist is
the recipient, the incentive effect may well be
efficiency-enhancing if the venture capitalist
himself remains responsible for serving the loan
even after individual ventures have failed.
However, there always remains a problem of
adverse selection in the sense that both gov-
ernment guarantees and loans may attract new
entrants into the venture capital industry who
lack the sophisticated skills and experiences
needed for successful screening and monitoring
of high-tech business start-ups. The reason for
this is that governments are unlikely to know
how to screen out the hypocrites among venture
capitalists, which is particularly difficult when
the venture capitalists are technologically spe-
cialized and when there are many new entrants
who have not had any prior opportunity to build
a pertinent reputation. The dire consequence of29
a lower quality of management support offered
by the average venture capitalists may not only
be that outside investors are deterred from
committing capital, but also that the founders of
high-tech firms may become hesitant about ac-
cepting venture capital and the partial loss of
control this entails. Hence, if the lower quality
of management support is properly taken into
account, an ill-conceived scheme of govern-
ment subsidies or investment guarantees may
even raise the effective costs of capital to new
technology-based firms.
As a macroeconomic implication, our theo-
retical discussion suggests that venture capital-
ists may seek less technological specialization
than they should in order to fully capture dy-
namic economies of scale if subsidies reduce
the relative importance placed on venture capi-
talists' non-financial services. The consequence
of reduced technological specialization is not
only a direct efficiency loss, which is due to the
key role played by specialization in reducing
the adverse selection and moral hazard of fi-
nancing unknown and untested young entrepre-
neurs: Like reputational capital, a strong tech-
nological specialization enables the venture
capitalist to get involved with new technology-
based firms at an earlier stage in their develop-
ment. But there is also an indirect efficiency
loss: Since the strategic choices of competing
venture capitalists are interdependent, reduced
specialization by individual venture capitalists
implies that the venture capital industry as a
whole will be less specialized as well. And this
may leave the international division of labour at
a suboptimal level.
The political economy of subsidies suggests
that policymakers may wish to target them at
those subsets of high technology where foreign
competitors have attained a technological lead.
For example, much of the official rhetoric about
Germany's recent initiatives to support start-ups
in biotechnology reveals this kind of motiva-
tion. But our theoretical discussion of venture
capital suggests that such targeting would be a
mistake. In the event of scale economies in the
production of tradeables, whether static or dy-
namic, world welfare is maximized if all related
activities are concentrated in one region or
country, which therefore specializes on the re-
spective industry so as to realize the maximum
scale compatible with world demand. If another
country then uses targeted subsidies for its
domestic venture capital industry in order to
shift the established comparative advantages in
its own "favour", world welfare will inevitably
be reduced, at least during a transitional period,
to the extent that the subsidies lead to a less
concentrated allocation of the activities that are
subject to scale economies. A better policy
strategy for a country seeking to establish a
domestic venture capital industry for the first
time may be to target subsidies so as to seek
entry through its own window of opportunity.
The window of opportunity will usually lie in
newly emerging high technologies for which no
other country has already developed a com-
parative advantage.
But our theoretical discussion suggests that
public support for venture capital need not be
targeted at particular subsets of high technology
in order to initiate a process of learning-by-
doing and technological specialization by ven-
ture capitalists. Such a process will be self-re-
inforcing when the opportunity is there and the
conditions are right. Nor should governments,
by the same token, require as a condition for
public support that venture capitalists hold
diversified portfolios of firms specializing on
different subsets of high technology, because
this would slow down the process of techno-
logical specialization which has been shown to
be an efficient market response to the infor-
mational and incentive problems that bedevil
the external financing of technological innova-
tion.
Instead, policymakers must be aware that not
only the specialization of individual venture
capitalists comes at the price of foregone di-
versification of risk (Norton and Tenenbaum
1993). When an individual venture capitalist
chooses to specialize on one particular technol-
ogy in order to build reputational capital, this
will normally imply a high degree of speciali-
zation with respect to geographic location, in-
dustrial affiliation and development stages of
portfolio firms as well. But also a highly spe-
cialized venture capital industry as a whole may30
lead to a less diversified industrial structure
than would be supported by a bank-centred
system in a small open economy. The econ-
omy's pool of entrepreneurial talent may sim-
ply be too limited to reap technological oppor-
tunities in more than one area of specialization.
But with fully liberalized capital accounts, con-
sumers will nevertheless be able to hold diver-
sified, and therefore less risky, portfolios of
capital, including domestic and foreign venture
capital investments, no matter how specialized
the domestic venture capital market actually is.
So it need not necessarily be a concern for
policymakers if the emergence of a domestic
venture capital industry creates new compara-
tive advantages which may appear to increase
the riskiness of the economy's profile of tech-
nological and industrial specialization.
3.2 Policy Experiences
The comparative evaluation of actual policies in
different countries is complicated by the fact
that not only structural conditions but also the
mix of policy-induced barriers to the develop-
ment of venture capital may differ significantly
between countries and, indeed, have been
changing rapidly in some European countries.
For example, the large and highly liquid stock
markets of the United States and the United
Kingdom have traditionally provided more fa-
vourable exit opportunities than the bank-domi-
nated financial systems of continental Europe
(Black and Gilson 1998). Recently of course,
several European countries, seeking to emulate
the success of the NASDAQ stock exchange in
the United States, have made strides in estab-
lishing their own stock market segments for
new technology-based firms, using a mixture of
public and private initiatives. In addition, some
of the other conditions which we have called
policy-induced barriers to venture capital have
also changed in presumably significant ways.
But we shall not attempt a comprehensive
evaluation here. Instead, we shall merely glance
at the specific experiences with fiscal subsidies
for venture capital which the United Kingdom,
the United States, the Netherlands and Germany
have made. While all four have indeed used
public subsidies to stimulate the supply of ven-
ture capital to new technology-based firms in
their early and expansion stages, the details
have differed and so have the outcomes, as far
as they can be evaluated on the basis of the
limited data that is publicly available.
Indirect policies promoting individual in-
vestments through tax incentives have been
particularly popular in the United Kingdom. As
early as 1981, the British government launched
the Business Start-up Scheme in order to en-
courage private investments into early-stage or
other small, privately held firms. In 1983, this
scheme became the Business Expansion
Scheme (BES), under which up to £ 40,000 of
an individual's eligible equity investment could
be deducted from taxable income. Although the
scheme initially restricted the tax incentives to
direct equity investments in new firms, it was
later modified with the result that the bulk of
subsidized investments actually went into spe-
cial funds which were set up and run under the
BES. In 1993/94, the BES was replaced by the
Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS), granting
20 per cent tax relief to investors who invest up
to £ 100,000 a year in small firms. In addition,
the more general Capital Gains Tax Re-Invest-
ment Relief and the Venture Capital Trusts
were introduced (Venture Capital in the UK
1996). These venture capital trusts are intended
to stimulate investments by individuals in small
unquoted firms by granting 20 per cent tax
relief on investments of up to £ 100,000 in any
one year and by exempting all returns from
capital gains and income tax, but eligible trusts
can only invest their capital in firms with gross
assets of less than £ 10 million.
According to the OECD (1996), the BES has
been successful in raising substantial amounts
of capital. But the efficiency of subsidizing
venture capital through tax incentives has been
questioned on a number of counts. First and
foremost, by requiring that individuals invest
directly in privately held firms or via special
new funds, the BES has largely bypassed es-
tablished intermediaries, like pension funds and
life insurers, and wasted their expertise in
dealing with venture capitalists. Moreover^ the
special new funds set up and run under the BES31
have probably crowded out fully private ven-
ture capitalists who might have played a larger
role in the absence of the BES. On the other
hand, it must be said that making all venture in-
vestments through established intermediaries
eligible for tax relief would have been in con-
flict with the intended targeting of the subsidies
at the early and expansion stages of new tech-
nology-based firms. Secondly, by tying tax in-
centives to the amount invested, they become
more expensive than tax relief on capital gains,
which only rewards the winners and hence
better strengthens the incentives for venture
capitalists to build a reputation for cultivating
winning firms. And thirdly, because the fiscal
incidence of tax incentives depends on the
endogenous response of investors, it is hard to
predict their subsidy equivalent ex ante, which
in turn makes it very difficult to base the de-
cision about the size of the tax incentives on the
desired level of support for venture capital. For
example, the amounts raised through Venture
Capital Trusts have disappointed policymakers
in the United Kingdom (Taylor 1997).
Direct policies promoting investments in the
early and expansion stages of new technology-
based firms have been adopted with varying
success in the United States, the Netherlands
and Germany. The first direct support policy, a
loan scheme, was established in the United
States with the Small Business Investment Act
of 1958, which channelled low-interest govern-
ment credits through so-called Small Business
Investment Companies (SBICs) into small and
medium-sized growth firms. SBICs are feder-
ally sponsored, yet privately owned and man-
aged, profit-oriented investment funds which
make debt and equity investments in their port-
folio firms and are regulated by the US Small
Business Administration (SBA). During their
heyday in the 1960s, SBICs were often able to
obtain four low-interest government dollars in
debt, guaranteed by the SBA, for each dollar of
own equity invested. Between 1958 and 1969
alone, the SBIC programme provided more than
three times the total private venture capital in-
vestments in the United States (Noone and
Rubel 1970). According to the SBA (1996), the
costs of the scheme have been more than
covered by the tax revenues generated each
year from successful investments. However, a
declining stock market led to the venture capital
draught of the 1970s, when venture capital al-
most vanished. Regulation was tightened and
SBICs became almost non-existent.
Today's venture capital firms in the United
States take a variety of legal forms. SBICs,
whose government funding no longer comes as
loans but as preferred equity, and the so-called
captives, which are owned by either banks or
industrial corporations, have lost market shares
to the ten-year private limited partnership, a
self-liquidating fund, which has emerged as the
dominant organizational form during the 1980s
and which already controlled four fifth of US
venture capital in 1989. The strict separation
between limited and general partners, which
this legal form affords, appears to have special
advantages for the management of venture
capital and for the acquisition of outside funds:
It grants limited liability status to the limited
partners and does not jeopardize pension funds'
non-taxable status. Moreover, there is no cor-
porate taxation, only the income of individual
partners is taxable at the time of realizing the
capital gains upon the preagreed termination of
the fund. Taken together, it appears that these
indirect tax incentives, which the ten-year pri-
vate limited partnership is designed to exploit,
have effectively crowded out the old SBICs
whose every existence depended on govern-
ment loans.
However, through a variety of support
schemes, the US federal government and nu-
merous state governments have continued to
subsidize young technology-based firms. The
largest such programme to date has been the
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
programme, which between 1983 and 1995
provided over US$ 6 billion worth of public
research contracts to small businesses in the
United States. Lerner (1996) has calculated that
SBIR awards, reaching a total volume of US$
847 million in 1995, have become comparable
in size to the annual volume of early-stage in-
vestments by private venture capital funds in
the United States. In his empirical assessment
of the SBIR programmes' long-term impact,32
Lerner (1996) finds that the growth rates of
employment and sales in recipient firms sub-
stantially exceed those of a set of matching
firms, but these positive effects appear to have
been confined to geographic areas which al-
ready had significant private venture capital in-
dustries before receiving SBIR awards. Thus,
instead of crowding out private venture capital,
government awards made under the SBIR pro-
gramme actually appear to complement it.
Lerner (1996) tentatively attributes this sur-
prising result to a liquidity and a signalling
effect, which the SBIR awards appear to have
in the financing of innovations. With respect to
liquidity, receipt of an SBIR award often helps
young firms to extend the length of time until
refinancing must be sought from a private ven-
ture capitalist. And with respect to signalling,
potential venture capital providers and custom-
ers may interpret the award as a signal of supe-
rior quality of the firm's technology. Unfortu-
nately, the geographic confinement of positive
growth effects from SBIR awards raises doubts
about the usefulness of this and similar subsidy
schemes as a catalyst for the emergence of
venture capital in hitherto unendowed regions
or countries.
This point is reinforced by the policy expe-
rience of the Netherlands during the 1980s and
early 1990s, when massive public subsidies re-
sulted in widespread disappointment. Drawing
on a detailed comparison with the US market,
Brouwer and Hendrix (1998) have argued that,
despite massive public support, the Dutch ven-
ture capital industry failed to build a reputation
among outside investors for high-quality IPOs
from early-stage investments. As a consequence
of many years of disappointing performance
and scandals which had surrounded stocks from
venture capital-backed IPOs, the Dutch "Pa-
rallelmarket" (PM), which had been founded in
1982, was even closed down in 1993. In search
for a proximate explanation, Brouwer and
Hendrix (1998) have attributed the failure of
Dutch venture capitalists to build a reputation to
their lack of a long-term strategy which resulted
in the overpricing of IPOs and in the sale of too
many shares from the venture capitalist's port-
folio at the time of the IPO. With hindsight, the
IPO market was overheating during the 1984-
1986 period. Brouwer and Hendrix (1998) report
estimates, according to which the initial rate of
return (underpricing) of IPOs on the PM was
28.4 %, which is not dramatically higher than the
average of 8.4 % on the official market. PM turn-
over and the number of IPOs declined after the
general stock market crash of 1987 until the
PM's closure in 1993. The scandals that further
tainted venture capitalists' reputation included
fraudulent dealings around bankruptcies. More
fundamental, however, may have been the in-
determinate length of life of Dutch venture capi-
tal funds, which Brouwer and Hendrix (1998) see
as providing insufficient incentives for venture
capitalists to build a reputation because, unlike
US venture capitalists, they need not worry about
refinancing after a set date. This, in turn, may
have contributed to a loss of public trust in early-
stage Dutch IPOs and may thus have made
further early-stage investments unattractive to
venture capitalists seeking to exit via the Dutch
stock market.
The rise of Dutch venture capital during the
1980s had been supported by regulatory reform,
e.g. by the partial lifting of the ban on equi-
ty investments by Dutch banks in 1980, and
by fiscal subsidies. Of particular importance
was the introduction of the "Garantieregeling
Particuliere Participatiemaatschappijen" (Guar-
antee Settlement Private Participation Societies)
by the Dutch government in 1981, which gave
qualified venture capital firms (PPMs) up to a
50 per cent retribution of losses suffered on
individual venture capital investments. The full
50 per cent compensation, up to a maximum of
50 million guilders, was only paid if the venture
capitalist exited within ten years after foun-
dation. Brouwer and Hendrix (1998) report that
the popularity of the "Garantieregeling" in-
creased sharply when the maximum guarantee
was raised to four million guilders of invest-
ment per deal in 1986. Private investors then
swarmed to start PPMs, whereas regional and
captive PPMs (mainly owned by banks) had
been the main beneficiaries of the guarantees
before. But compensation payments also in-
creased sharply. Quick exiting, which had be-
come rampant, was prohibited in 1988. Al-33
though a quarter of all new venture capital
investments still fell under the PPM scheme in
1990, there was rising disappointment about
venture capitalists' search for quick profits in-
stead of long-term reputation, and efforts were
made to concentrate the subsidies on the start-
up stage of new technology-based firms. The
"Garantieregeling" was limited to an invest-
ment of 75 million guilders in 1990, and to 50
million guilders in 1991, with a maximum
guarantee of 25 million guilders per portfolio
firm. The "Garantieregeling" was terminated at
the end of 1995, amid disappointment about its
failure to stimulate early-stage investment.
The German policy experience of support for
venture capital includes elements of both loan
and guarantee schemes. In 1998, as in other re-
cent years, the most important subsidy scheme
has been the "KfW-Technologiebeteiligungs-
programm" (Technology Participation Scheme;
BTU), in which the "Kreditanstalt fur Wieder-
aufbau" (KfW), Germany's state development
bank, committed DM 223 million in subsidized
loans to venture capitalists and banks which
themselves committed a minimum of DM 1
million. These loans are intended to refinance
75 per cent, up to a maximum of ECU 1.5 mil-
lion, of venture capitalists' holdings of private
equity in qualified high-tech start-ups. In order
to become eligible, the venture capitalist must
present a portfolio firm less than ten years old,
with fewer than 50 employees and with annual
sales below ECU 7 million. While the duration
of each credit cannot exceed ten years, the KfW
bears the risk for its share in the respective
venture.
The second largest subsidy scheme in 1998
has been the "KfW-Risikokapitalprogramm"
(Risk Capital Programme; RKP), in which the
KfW committed DM 65 million in guarantees
and DM 147 million in subsidized loans of up
to ECU 5 million to venture capitalists and
banks holding private equity in small and me-
dium-sized firms with annual sales of less than
ECU 500 million. Guarantees are for up to 40
per cent of the default risk to the venture capi-
talist, and the duration of both loans and guar-
antees is again 10 years. The explicit primary
purpose of this scheme is to support bridge
financing for young privately held firms plan-
ning an initial public offering of shares (IPO) in
addition to a general expansion of their business
activities. The third largest subsidy scheme in
1998 has been the "ERP-Beteiligungspro-
gramm" (ERP-Participation Programme), in
which the KfW committed almost DM 180
million to small and medium-sized firms with
less than 500 employees and annual sales below
ECU 50 million. Although the conditions of
this scheme are similar to the BTU programme,
the "ERP-Beteiligungsprogramm" explicitly
excludes any guarantees in case of default or
bankruptcy of the respective venture.
In addition, the federal and state govern-
ments have launched numerous other subsidy
schemes to support high-tech start-ups. For ex-
ample, the "Technologie-Beteiligungs-Gesell-
schaft" (Technology Participation Society; tbg),
an affiliate of the "Deutsche Ausgleichsbank",
offers equity to small high-tech firms whose
sales are still below ECU 14 million and which
have secured a matching equity participation
from a private venture capitalist. Moreover,
special subsidy schemes have been set up for
small and medium-sized firms located in East-
ern Germany, notably the "KfW-Beteiligungs-
fonds Ost" with commitments of DM 192 mil-
lion in 1998 alone. Under this scheme, the KfW
grants subsidized loans to venture capitalists,
banks, industrial corporations or even indi-
viduals holding private equity in firms with less
than ECU 500 million in annual sales. The loan
ceiling is set at 100 per cent of the supported
equity stake, whose maximum size is ECU 10
million, and 50 per cent of the default risk to
the investor is guaranteed by the KfW. Some
schemes can even be employed cumulatively in
some parts of Germany.
Given this multitude of subsidy schemes for
private equity participations in small and me-
dium-sized firms, many observers have noted
that, contrary to the persistent popular belief of
a venture capital draught in Germany, the
country is now actually awash with venture
capital. Not only does a young German entre-
preneur in the late 1990s have easier access to
venture capital than his counterpart in the
United States, where 99 per cent of applicants34
for venture capital are routinely rejected. But
also the monetary user costs of venture capital
to the entrepreneur may well be lower in
Germany than in the United States. Unfortu-
nately, these quantitative measures say little
about the quality of venture capitalists' non-
financial services. Insiders openly talk about the
dangers of moral hazard and adverse selection,
one sign of which is the fact that the high
valuations on Germany's "Neuer Markt" stock
market segment are beginning to attract young
firms from abroad, including the United States,
which apparently anticipate lower costs of
raising equity capital on Germany's relatively
young "Neuer Markt" than even on America's
booming NASDAQ. This sign may indicate that
the German venture capital cycle may well be
approaching its peak quite soon. Hence, it is
probably too early to judge the success of the
various German policy initiatives whose inten-
tion has been to stimulate the supply of venture
capital. The ultimate test of venture capital's
resilience will only come during the next bear
market for stocks, which is likely to be fol-
lowed by a recession in the very high-tech in-
dustries whose expansion has hitherto been
fuelled by heavily subsidized venture capital.
This test will reveal how many new technology-
based firms actually fit the description by an
insider quoted in The Economist (1999: 30),
characterizing Germany's emerging biotech-
nology industry as consisting of "scientific
projects in a business wrapper, with a narrow
product pipeline and a critical lack of manage-
rial expertise".
Summing up, there is some evidence that the
different schemes of support for venture capital
have had the mixed success which we had pre-
dicted in our theoretical discussion. In particu-
lar, loan schemes like those in the United States
appear to have had fewer and less serious nega-
tive side-effects in terms of supporting the
wrong sort of ventures and the wrong sort of
actors in the venture capital industry. By con-
trast, the Dutch PPM guarantee scheme of the
1980s and early 1990s must probably be con-
sidered a failure. The German policies may well
prove hardest to evaluate, not only because
many are of recent vintage, but also because
many of them mix elements of a loan scheme
with elements of a guarantee scheme. The
problems encountered by the indirect policy
approach of the UK government are of a some-
what different nature because tax incentives on
their own seem to lack the necessary focus to
lure venture capitalists into early-stage deals.
Hence, there is a genuine dilemma for policy-
makers in that only some of the more direct and
more activist subsidy schemes seem to yield
measurable results soon enough to be attribut-
able to these support policies, but governments
in countries without venture capital generally
lack the specific technological expertise and
knowledge of market conditions to execute
such direct policies efficiently.
4 Conclusions
While Europe in the 1990s has seen spectacular
growth in venture capital, ironically, this may
Tiave made governments more complacent about
the many remaining barriers. Europe's current
venture mania is only partly due to the internal
and external liberalization of capital markets;
possibly in larger part, it must be attributed to
several unique developments in the 1990s,
namely the stock market boom in anticipation
of monetary union, the inflow of surplus funds
for venture capital investments from the United
States and, last but not least, the massive sub-
sidies that several European governments have
extended. These favourable developments are
partly one-time events (like monetary union),
partly cyclical developments (like the inflow of
US capital) and partly politically motivated
subsidies. Thus, it will remain unclear whether
conditions have changed fundamentally enough
to permit a self-sustaining venture capital mar-
ket in all EU countries until the current boom
has reached its peak and subsidies have been
phased out.
There are then two possible outcomes, either
continued growth or decline of what are still
fragile venture capital markets in several Euro-
pean countries. A decline would suggest that
fundamental conditions do not favour venture
capital in the respective economy and that sub-35
sidization has been in vain. Given Europe's less
favourable structural conditions, however, the
removal of the remaining barriers may or may
not change the overall picture very much. Con-
tinued growth, on the other hand, would sug-
gest that temporary subsidies may have been
helpful in kicking off a venture capital market
that would be viable in the long term. In this
case, the removal of the remaining barriers
would further improve the efficiency of the
venture capital market. Neither outcome, how-
ever, would call for continued subsidies.
And there is another lesson for policymakers:
Besides being ineffective (in the face of adverse
fundamentals) or superfluous (after the market
has surpassed its infant-industry stage), sub-
sidies may even be counter-productive. Sub-
sidies which are channelled through private
venture capital intermediaries, of which public
guarantees are a special example, carry the risk
of new distortions, because they tend to make
outside investors and fund managers less care-
ful about weighing the risks of their investment
decisions (moral hazard). Moreover, subsidies
may attract people to the venture capital busi-
ness who are poorly qualified to assess the
prospects and risks of specific new technologies
(adverse selection). When subsidies thereby
lead to a waste of human capital as well as to an
unwarranted change in technological priorities,
an open economy might move to a pattern of
specialization at odds with fundamental com-
parative advantages. The welfare loss to an
open economy could then indeed be substantial.
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